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Abstract

From David Axelrod to Karl Rove, political consultants have come to play a
crucial role in American elections, and yet we know little about how they influence the political process. In particular, consultants serve as an important
part of the web of informal relationships that play an important role in contemporary parties. Using data from Politics magazine (formerly Campaigns
& Elections), we present the first systematic analysis of the networks of Republican and Democratic consultants and their House and Senate general
election clients from 1992–2008. After introducing the characteristics of these
networks, we estimate a spatial lag model demonstrating that campaigns’ positions in the network of campaign consultants influences the strategies they
use. We then show that consultants whose clients achieve significant electoral
victories become increasingly central to the consultant-candidate network in
the subsequent election cycle. In this way, consultants play a crucial role in
helping parties successfully adapt to changing electoral circumstances.

Prepared for presentation at the Political Networks Conference, Duke University, Durham, NC,
May 19–21, 2010. We thank Jeremy Kreisberg, Boris Litvin, and Joy Wilke for exceptional research
assistance and Michael Heaney for providing support for their work. We also gratefully acknowledge James N. Druckman, Martin J. Kifer, and Michael Parkin for providing the candidate website
data analyzed in Section 4.
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Introduction

From both a theoretical and empirical standpoint, the study of American political parties is plagued by difficulties. There is no longer much room to doubt in
this historical era that party institutions “matter” in a generic sense, at least with
respect to the behavior of candidates and elected officials. Indeed, there is abundant evidence in recent scholarship showing that parties are more influential and
important now than at any other point in the post-war era. However, the precise
organizational mechanisms and institutional configurations through which parties exert influence remain obscure. This is particularly true when it comes to the
study of the “parties-as-organizations.” Although formal party organizations exist, their influence and capacity has lagged the growth in partisanship we observe
amongst elites in the last few decades (Aldrich 2000; Gibson et al. 1983). This
growth in partisanship may instead be rooted in informal and often unobserved
interactions outside of formal party organizations and institutions (Masket 2009).
Specifically, we argue that political party organizations should be viewed not
as formal hierarchical institutions, but rather as an adaptive network of formal
and informal relationships. An important component of this contemporary party
structure is the network of relationships between candidates and their political
consultants. Although relatively little scholarship has focused on consultants,
there are many reasons to suspect that they are central players in the contemporary party, especially given the organizational and strategic challenges of modern
political campaigns. Most importantly, consultants bring strategies to their clients,
these strategies are transmitted through a network of working relationships as
consultants collaborate, and firms that win important races become more central
within the network. In this way, parties adapt and adjust the tactics and issues
they use in a decentralized manner, rewarding success and penalizing failure.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by describing our theoretical perspective on the role of consultants in contemporary parties and specifying several
empirical hypotheses that must hold for our theory to be applicable. Next, we
describe our data—listings of consultant-candidate relationships that were pub1

lished Politics (formerly Campaigns & Elections) from 1992–2008—and analyze the
resulting set of consultant-candidate networks. Using spatial statistics techniques,
we find support for the hypothesis that the strategies candidates implement is in
part determined by their location in the consultant-candidate network. We also
show that consultants become more central within the network when they achieve
significant electoral victories. We conclude with a brief discussion of our results
and future directions for research.
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How consultants help parties adapt

Our theory is that campaign consulting firms are a crucial mechanism for accomplishing two basic tasks of party organizations: adaptation and coordination. The network of consultant-candidate relationships represent an institution
that is well-designed to test and refine innovative campaign tactics and messages,
spread those innovations through the network to other competitive campaigns,
and thus facilitate the coordinated response of agents across many constituencies
to changes in the electoral environment. Thus, parties can best be conceived not
as a formal institution characterized by centralized control and coordination, but
rather as a more flexible adaptive network of both formal and informal relationships (Monroe 2001; Koger, Masket and Noel 2009; Herrnson 2009). This adaptive
network is capable of promoting efficient and coordinated responses to changing
conditions throughout the party in ways not otherwise achievable given the heterogeneity of campaign environments and the institutional limits of centralized
party control in the American setting.
This view of party organizations as adaptive networks rests on four basic assumptions, which will be the focus of our empirical tests below:
• Consultants are partisans: Consultants who play a strategic role in campaigns
(i.e., general, media, and polling consultants) should rarely, if ever, cross
party lines. While they operate outside formal party institutions, these consultants are informally members of one of the two major parties.
2

• Consultants influence campaigns: Consulting firms influence the strategies,
tactics, and messages of the campaigns and candidates who employ them.
• Consultants disseminate strategies: Consultant-candidate relationships should
be viewed as a network through which political strategies are transmitted
across space (campaigns) and time (between elections). Consultant firms
should learn from their experience in the campaigns and from their interaction with other consultants employed by campaigns.
• Consultant success is rewarded: Consulting firms that are more successful earn
more prominent positions in this network, and thus both their direct and
indirect influence increases over time.
In this section, we elaborate on each of these points and discuss how they relate to
previous studies of party organizations and political consultants. We then specify
the empirical relationships that we would expect to observe if these conditions are
met.

2.1

Rethinking the consultant-party relationship

Party organizations, like all organizations, must fulfill a set of basic functions that
include acquiring and transmitting information internally and recruiting and instructing new members (David 1994). These tasks are especially critical for political parties given their need to quickly adapt to changes in the political environment while maintaining message consistency and preserving the valuable party
“label” (Grynaviski 2010; Snyder and Ting 2002). However, the means by which
these tasks are accomplished by parties are not well understood. In part, this
lack of understanding stems from the fact that the mechanisms the parties have
evolved to perform these functions are nothing like the hierarchical structures
common in corporate firms or more centralized parties in Europe. American parties achieve these goals via indirect, informal, and often hidden interactions between actors that exist at the edges of the formal party organizations (Noel 2010).
Consulting firms—like think tanks, bloggers, interest groups, 527s, and campaign
3

staffers—hold no formal positions within the parties, yet serve as important conduits through which effective political tactics are discovered and transmitted.
Specifically, parties face difficult problems of adaptation and coordination in
responding to changing electoral circumstances during campaigns that consultants help to address. Given time pressures and coordination difficulties during a
campaign, it is often not possible for formal party institutions to develop a centralized message, nor is it always clear that such an approach can develop a message
that will be effective. Consultants can facilitate decentralized exchanges of information within the party regarding effective messaging, responses to opponent
criticisms, and other tactics. Those consultants who are successful gain influence
and new clients as a result of their record, helping the party disseminate these
strategies and tactics more widely.
The view that campaign consulting firms are a valuable component of strong
party institutions stands in stark contrasts to several past studies of consultants
in American politics. Scholars such as Sabato (1981) and Shea (1996) argue that
consultants are either a worrying symptom of or significant causes of candidatecentered elections, weak party organization, and the growth of party-rivaling organizations such as PACs (see also Magleby, Patterson and Thurber 2000). However, such perspectives often take a narrow and hierarchical view of the content
and role of political parties. Indeed, the literature typically measures the strength
of party organizations based on the number of services they provide, their budgets, and their ability to directly influence campaigns and candidates through financial contributions or services (e.g., Aldrich 2000; Gibson et al. 1983).
However, parties may operate successfully while employing less hierarchical
institutional arrangements that reduce transactions costs and facilitate coordination and cooperation in a fluid and complex environment North (1990). Such
arrangements may even outperform more centralized structures (Enemark et al.
N.d.; Axelrod and Cohen 2001). Along these lines, some anecdotal evidence suggests that the parties have purposefully shied away from more centralized models
of party activity as less efficient and adaptive to changing environments:
In a time of continued technological advancement and when more and
4

more candidates are taking advantage of that technology, parties have
discovered that it is inefficient for them to provide all the necessary
services to their candidates form inside their headquarters. Therefore,
the parties have scaled back tremendously in the services they provide
to candidates, and have increased the amount of money they spend
paying bills for their candidates (Dulio 2004, 108-109).
By providing funding in place of services, parties allow candidates (and the consultants) to determine how best to allocate resources.
Another critique states that consultants pursue their own agenda at the expense of parties (Magleby, Patterson and Thurber 2000). While there are obviously principal-agent issues associated with these relationships (Walton and Walter 2009), the reputation and profitability of these firms are at least partially linked
to the success of their clients, which aligns many of their incentives with those of
the parties. Similarly, commercial concerns encourage consulting firms to invest
in building their campaign expertise and institutional capacities, creating institutional resources that will help elect party members in the future.
We are not the first to argue that the relationship between parties and consultants is not competitive but rather complementary (c.f., Dulio 2004; Kolodny and
Logan 1998; Dulio and Nelson 2005). Numerous scholars have argued that parties
and consultants are engaged in a symbiotic relationship that largely benefits both.
In this view, consultants and parties are allies. However, our stance is stronger.
We do not view consultants as allies of the political parties, but as a component of
the parties. This view rests on the theoretical point that parties are not individual
agents with specific goals, but institutions that have evolved to fulfill certain tasks
(Aldrich 1995).
This view is consistent with a growing body of theoretical and empirical research that has sought to move beyond formal organizations and rules to focus
on the informal patterns of behavior and interactions that help shape American
parties (e.g., Noel 2010; Monroe 2001; Masket 2009; Skinner 2005; Herrnson 2009;
Nyhan and Tofias N.d.). Specifically, research on contemporary party organizations must broaden its focus to include the wider class of agents that coordinate
5

on the task of electing candidates such as interest groups, 527s, bloggers, and think
tanks. This paper seeks to add campaign consultants to the growing list of actors
that exist at the party edge—not fully incorporated within its formal institutions
but still key players in the larger partisan network.

2.2

Consultants as agents of party adaptation

This theoretical perspective on the role of consultants in parties generates three
empirical expectations that we test below. First, we predict that almost all campaign consulting firms are highly partisan (excluding technical consultants who
provide specific services like direct mail and websites). If campaign consulting
firms are actors existing at the edge of the party organizations, it seems clear that
they cannot cross party lines. Thus, our theory requires that consultants work primarily (or even exclusively) with clients of one major party. This hypothesis has
also received some support in past research, which shows that in recent years most
consultants work primarily with candidates from a single party. For instance, a
1997 survey of consultants by Kolodny and Logan (1998) found that only 8% of
general consultants reported working about equally with candidates from both
parties. In addition, it is well known that parties purposefully direct candidates
towards “loyal” consulting firms, and may even premise the distribution of party
funds on contracting with approved consultants (Kolodny and Logan 1998).
Hypothesis 1: Consulting firms will very rarely work with congressional campaigns from both major parties.
In addition, we expect that consulting firms influence the messages and tactics employed by their clients. As a general matter, the evidence seems clear that
consulting firms play a key role in modern elections. Campaigns must organize
what is essentially a small corporation in the months leading up to an election and
successfully carry out a series of complex logistical, organizational, and strategic
tasks. They msut raise and millions of dollars, conduct polls, develop media campaigns, coordinate hundreds (if not thousands) of volunteers and much more.
6

These wild temporal fluctuations in organizational capacity can only be accomplished with reliance on the expertise and organizational capacity of consulting
firms, who thus have a great deal of leverage to guide campaigns toward specific
strategies and messages. For instance, previous studies provide support for claims
of consultant influence on negative advertising (e.g., Swint 1998; Francia and Herrnson 2007; Grossman N.d.), fundraising (Herrnson 1992; Dulio 2004), electoral
outcomes (Medvic and Lenart 1997; Dulio 2004), messaging (Johnson 2001), and
public policy (Lathrop 2003).
This process places consulting firms in a unique position to learn about effective techniques and strategies and implement the lessons that have been learned
throughout the party. Campaigns often hire general strategists, pollsters, and/or
media consultants who must work together in support of clients. These interactions create a network of professional relationships that facilitates the spread of
innovative and effective strategies and messages across campaigns and over time.
We therefore expect campaigns’ locations in the consultant-candidate network to
be associated with the strategies that they employ.
Hypothesis 2: The tactics used by candidates will be associated with their
location in the consultant-candidate network.
Finally, we expect that the process of strategic adaptation described above will
be reinforced by market pressures on consultants. Firms that are successful should
tend to earn contracts with more campaigns, especially those that are more prominent (and lucrative). In network terms, these firms should subsequently gain in
prestige, influence, and centrality. By contrast, market pressures should work
to ensure that firms that fail to develop effective strategies are marginalized and
eventually eliminated. This selection process is the mechanism by which the interests of consulting firms, candidates, and parties are (imperfectly) aligned. The
rewards for success encourage consultants to learn about effective strategies and
spread them to their clients. Although there is anecdotal evidence supporting this
claim, we are not aware of empirical research on the subject.
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Hypothesis 3: Consulting firms who are more successful in winning elections
become increasingly central in the consultant-candidate network.

3

The consultant-candidate network

We study consultant-candidate networks for House and Senate general elections
during the 1992–2008 period (excluding special elections). The data were gathered
from scorecards published at the end of each election cycle in Politics magazine,
which was previously known as Campaigns & Elections. The scorecards, which
are typically a combination of self-reports by consulting firms and research by
the magazine’s staff, provide the most comprehensive information available on
consultant-candidate relationships in federal elections. Rather than studying an
individual election cycle as in previous research (e.g., Medvic and Lenart 1997),
we aggregate data from nine election cycles, allowing us to examine changes in
the consultant-candidate network over time.1 The Politics/C&E scorecards unfortunately do not include specifics on the consultant-candidate relationship such
as services provided or total spending. However, the services provided by each
firm are listed. Since our interest is primarily in the substance of campaigns, we
restrict our sample to firms providing general , media, and/or polling consulting; all dyads in which the firm does not provide one of those services (typically
these are specialists in discrete functions such as fundraising, direct mail, etc.) are
excluded. The resulting dataset was then merged with election data from CQ’s
Voting and Elections Collection and processed into a network format for analysis.

3.1

Stability in consultant usage over time

Before proceeding to our analysis of the networks themselves, we first briefly
characterize general patterns in consultant usage during the period of our analysis. While early studies emphasized the explosive growth of the consulting in1 We

exclude 1990 since there were approximately half as many consultant-candidate dyads as
in 1992, which could indicate that the industry had not yet matured or that the data are incomplete.
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dustry in the 1980s, our data indicate that the industry subsequently reached maturity. As more recent work suggests, consultants are ubiquitous in competitive
federal election campaigns. However, the number of campaigns that use professional consulting services is relatively stable. For instance, Figure 1 indicates that
the proportion of candidates with one or more consultants whose firms provide
general, media, or polling consulting services is relatively flat in this period.This
trend holds when we disaggregate the data by chamber, which is plotted in Figure
1(a), and by party, which is plotted in Figure 1(b).2
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that consultant usage is approximately stable over
time when we break out the data by race type and consultant service. Figure
2(a) shows that House candidates with previous electoral experience (who we call
“quality” candidates following Jacobson [1989]) running for open seats are the
most likely to have one or more consultants. They are followed by incumbents
(since many don’t have competitive races), open seat candidates without previous electoral experience, challengers with previous electoral experience, and challengers who lack such experience. With the exception of a significant increase in
consultant usage by non-quality open seat candidates in 1994 and the significant
decrease in consultant usage by incumbents since 2002, each of these categories
is relatively stable over time. Finally, Figure 2(b) shows that usage of consultants
by the types of services provided is also relatively stable during this period, although there is again a noticeable decrease in overall usage (mostly since 2002)
that is primarily driven by incumbents.
While the consulting industry is hardly static, this relative stability in the scope
of consultant usage allows us to leverage our data over time and make inferences
that are not possible in the cross-sectional framework typically used in previous
studies. Specifically, we can (in some cases) pool data across years to increase our
sample size and also characterize firm trajectories across election cycles.
2 It also holds if we consider the mean number of consultants per candidate rather than the
proportion of candidates with at least one consultant (results available upon request).
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Figure 2: Consultant usage by race type and service
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Figure 3: 2002 consultant-candidate network

Democrats

Republicans

3.2

Network descriptive analysis

When we convert these data into bipartite network format and plot the results,
we observe that these networks do not overlap in any meaningful way, providing
support for Hypothesis 1. Figure 3 provides an illustrative example—the 2002
consultant-candidate network. The two largest components in the network are
portrayed in the figure (consultant nodes are solid black while candidate nodes
are white with black edges). Each one corresponds to a single party and there is no
overlap between them. Across nine election cycles, there are only five cases in the
data of consultants contracting with campaigns in both major parties in the same
year—a tiny fraction of all consultant-candidate dyads in our data. This behavior
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reflects a combination of party loyalty by consultants and intense market pressure
from clients to remain loyal to the party. For instance, Public Opinion Strategies,
a Republican polling firm, preemptively resigned from Florida governor Charlie
Crist’s Senate campaign when he announced he would leave the party to run as
an independent (Halperin 2010).
Based on these results, we split the data and analyze the party networks separately. Figure 4 displays plots of the consultant-candidate network by party for
2002 (again, consultant nodes are solid black while candidate nodes are white with
black edges; labels are omitted for visual clarity). Both the Democratic network in
Figure 4(a) and the Republican network in Figure 4(b) are relatively low density
(approximately .02 on average) and have a large connected component to whom
most nodes are connected.
One notable feature of the data is that some consultant nodes are connected to
a disproportionate number of candidates. We examine this supposition about the
distribution of candidate relationships more formally in Figure 5, which presents
degree distributions for both candidates and consultants in 2002 pooled across
the two parties (results are similar across election cycles). Figure 5(a) plots the
degree distributions of consultant relationships separately for House and Senate
candidates in 2002. While Senate campaigns tend to use more consultants providing general, media, or polling services, neither group of candidates displays the
highly unequal degree distribution that is characteristic of many social networks
(likely a reflection of capacity and financial constraints on the usage of large numbers of consultants.) However, Figure 5(b) provides evidence of such a pattern
among consulting firms. Most have only a few candidates, but the largest have a
huge number of clients. For example, the Republican polling firm Public Opinion
Strategies had 73 House and Senate clients in 2002 alone.
Indeed, when we plot the degree distribution of candidate relationships among
consultants from 2002 in log-log format in Figure 6, we observe an approximately
linear relationship (again, results are similar across years). We should be cautious about asserting that the relationship is distributed according to a power law
without conducting more extensive empirical tests (Clauset, Shalizi and Newman
13

Figure 4: 2002 consultant-candidate networks by party

(a) Democrats

(b) Republicans

14

Figure 5: Degree distributions of consultant-candidate networks
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Figure 6: Degree distributions for consultants (log-log plot)
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2009), but it is, at least, highly unequal.
To facilitate analysis, we also project the network into one-mode format for
both candidates and consultants. Figure 7 presents the projected GOP networks
for 2002 (labels are omitted for visual clarity). The projected candidate-by-candidate
network (where ties represent shared consultant relationships) is presented in Figure 7(a) and the projected consultant-by-consultant network (where ties represent
shared shared clients) is presented in Figure 7(b). The projected candidate network displays very high levels of clustering. However, such a result is often an
artifact of the projection of bipartite network data (Latapy, Magnien and Vecchio
2008). In this case, projection creates cliques among all candidates who share a
common consultant (and vice versa). Given the highly unequal degree distributions of candidate relationships among consultants, very large cliques of candidates are formed when the network is projected.
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Figure 7: 2002 GOP networks of candidates and consultants (projected)

(a) Candidates

(b) Consultants

17

4

Consultant influence on campaign strategy

After constructing consultant-candidate networks from our data, we next turn to
exploring the extent to which the strategies adopted by campaigns are correlated
with their location in the networks. Previous studies have primarily focused on
whether campaigns with consultants raised more money or received more votes
(e.g., Herrnson 1992; Medvic and Lenart 1997). Other research has focused on the
relationship between specific consulting firms and the particular strategy of negative campaigning (Grossman N.d.). However, consultants are likely to influence
campaign strategy on multiple dimensions such as issue emphases, policy positions, ideological location, fundraising tactics, allocation of advertising dollars,
and the emphasis placed on grass roots mobilization.
Unfortunately, there is surprisingly little easily accessible data on such campaign tactics, especially among unsuccessful challengers. One reason is that many
campaigns, especially non-competitive races or those that are distant from major media markets, provide little direct evidence by which their activities can be
evaluated. These campaigns often receive low levels of media coverage and do
not advertise on television. The most comprehensive effort to date to collect information on campaign messages and strategies is provided by Druckman, Kifer
and Parkin (2009, 2010), who collected information from the websites of federal
campaigns during the 2002–2006 time period, including all major party Senate
candidates and a random sample of major party candidates for the House.
The data provided by Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (hereafter DKP) evaluate
campaign websites along numerous dimensions. Some of these (e.g., whether the
website provide interactive features) are presumably more likely to be influenced
by campaign technology specialists rather than the pollsters, media consultants,
and general strategists on whom we focus. However, the DKP dataset also evaluates the substantive content of campaign websites, which they demonstrate provides an accurate representation of the more general strategies adopted by the
campaigns. Here, we focus specifically on three sets of campaign strategies: the
level of negativity of the campaigns, the general strategy employed (“issue own18

ership” and “risk-taking”), and the level of emphasis on specific personal features
of the candidate.3
To test the hypothesis that campaigns’ location in the consultant-candidate network influences campaign strategy, we estimated a spatial lag model that takes the
form y = ρWy + Xβ + e, where W is the N × N weighted matrix of network ties
in the projected (single-mode) candidate network. Following DKP, we include
members of both parties and pool across the elections of 2002, 2004, and 2006
(only about 21% of candidates appear in the dataset more than once, and only 6%
appear in all three cycles). ρ is a spatial autoregressive coefficient that estimates
the extent to which a campaign’s placement in the network is correlated with the
outcome y. In other words, ρ estimates the extent to which candidates who are
located “near” each other in the consultant-candidate network are more similar
than might be expected by chance. Note that W is a weighted matrix that takes into
account the number of consulting firms shared by each pair of candidates.
In addition to our measure of network associations, we also include several
important covariates in our statistical models. In each of the analyses below, we
include fixed effects for year, party, challenger status, open seats, candidate gender, and chamber (Senate or House). We also include a measure of the percent of
the district or state that voted for President Bush in 2000 (for the 2002 election) or
2004 (for the 2004/2006 elections). Other control variables are noted below.4
3 The

following analyses are not direct replications of DKP and should not be interpreted as
such. In most instances, we began our own empirical analysis by replicating their published results and then making adjustments to suit our own needs. Readers interested in a more detailed
description of the data and coding procedures are directed to the originally published articles and
the data documentation on Druckman’s website.
4 We deviate from the models reported by DKP by excluding variables that are likely to be
highly endogenous to both the outcomes of interest (campaign strategies) and our main explanatory variable of interest (consultant effects). In particular, we exclude the variable “front-runner
status,” which is actually measured as a function of the final vote total the candidate receives. We
also exclude their measure of “competition”, which is the Cook Political Report rating of the competitiveness of each race. With one exception, we also exclude the variable “funds raised,” which
is the amount of money raised by the campaign as reported to the FEC. In each case, these variables have been previously examined as outcomes of interest in studies of the effects of campaign
consultants. For more on problems with including post-treatment variables in statistical models,
see King and Zeng (2006).

19

Our first outcome of interest is the probability that the campaign website includes negative information about the opposing candidate. DKP provide information on (i) whether the website included any negative statements about the
opponent at all, (ii) whether the website included negative information that was
focused on the person (e.g., “my opponent is not trustworthy”), and (iii) whether
the website included negative statements about the opponent’s issue positions.
These latter variables, however, were only collected for the 2004 and 2006 cycles.
Because negative campaigning has been shown to be associated with highly contested races, we include control variables for the campaign funds raised by the
candidates and an indicator of whether the opposing candidate had made negative statements.5 Table 1 reports the results of our model. Our primary interest
in these tables is in the estimate of ρ and the likelihood-ratio test for a statistically
significant effect of the spatial lag parameter (indicating network effects). For both
the general negativity and the personal negativity models this estimate is positive
and statistically significant. The third column of Table 1 shows the results for
the issue negativity model, which shows no significant effect for the spatial lag
(p < .05). However, when disaggregated by chamber in columns 4-5, we observe
a strong positive estimate for ρ amongst Senate candidates.
DKP develop two more generalized scales of campaign strategy based on campaign websites. First, they generate a scale for the “riskiness” of a given campaign’s strategy. This scale, which ranges from -3 to 8, is higher for campaigns that
emphasize issues over experience, negative information, party, current polling
data, and personal information not directly related to experience as an elected
official or within the district.6 DKP provide a second general strategy variable referred to as “issue ownership.” This variable, which ranges from -20 to 26, is the
“weighted relative partisan advantage of issues discussed” (Druckman, Kifer and
Parkin 2009, 348). This variable is higher for candidates that focus their message
on issues where the candidates’ party is viewed as having an advantage in public
opinion polls. The results of our analysis are shown in Table 2. In addition to the
5 Results
6 More

are robust to the exclusion of these variables.
information on this variable is available in Druckman, Kifer and Parkin (2009).
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Table 1: Network effects on use of negativity

Intercept
2004
2006
Democrat
Challenger
Open seat
Female
District GOP
Senate
Funds raised
Opp. negativity
ρ
LR test
(p-value)
N

Negativity

Personal neg.

Issue neg.

-0.1274
(0.0842)
0.0662
(0.0418)
0.1408
(0.0419)
0.0601
(0.0315)
0.5760
(0.0368)
0.2796
(0.0485)
0.0890
(0.0420)
0.0021
(0.0014)
0.0355
(0.0453)
0.6859
(0.2299)
0.0462
(0.0357)
0.0079
(0.0033)
5.6134
0.0178
714

-0.0146
(0.0941)
-0.1345
(0.0369)
–

-0.0117
(0.0941)
-0.0657
(0.0365)
–

0.0565
(0.0359)
0.3677
(0.0419)
0.2774
(0.0594)
0.0082
(0.0477)
0.0014
(0.0015)
-0.0239
(0.0535)
0.4959
(0.2465)
0.0831
(0.0411)
0.0104
(0.0050)
4.0303
0.0447
546

0.0141
(0.0358)
0.5943
(0.0419)
0.2431
(0.0594)
0.0919
(0.0477)
0.0017
(0.0016)
0.0340
(0.0536)
0.6514
(0.2472)
0.0806
(0.0412)
0.0008
(0.0045)
0.0309
0.8604
546
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Issue neg.
(Senate only)
0.0336
(0.2761)
-0.0519
(0.0771)
–

Issue neg.
(House only)
-0.0340
(0.1004)
-0.0667
(0.0409)
–

0.0564
(0.0759)
0.5697
(0.0921)
0.1674
(0.1032)
0.1708
(0.1021)
0.0021
(0.0045)
–

0.0087
(0.0407)
0.6339
(0.0482)
0.2796
(0.0721)
0.0486
(0.0538)
0.0011
(0.0016)
–

0.5810
(0.2743)
-0.1237
(0.0902)
0.0317
(0.0100)
8.0738
0.0045
129

2.5884
(1.0667)
0.1079
(0.0467)
-0.0098
(0.0087)
1.2936
0.2554
417

standard controls, we also include DKP’s measure of issue salience and interactions between year and party as well as between party and the district or state’s
support for Bush. Again, our focus is not on the regression coefficients themselves, but on the estimate of ρ and the likelihood-ratio test reported at the bottom
of Table 2. Both the risk-taking and issue ownership models provide statistically
significant evidence of a correlation between campaign strategy and proximity in
the consultant-candidate network (p < .10 and p < .05, respectively).
Finally, we turn to several more disaggregated measures of campaign strategy. In Table 3, we examine four dimensions of campaign messaging identified by
DKP: whether the campaign website emphasizes the candidate’s leadership (i.e.,
statements about his or her general goals); competence (information on prior relevant experience); empathy (details about the candidates’ family); and the inclusion of polling results.7 The results in Table 3 again provide strong support for our
claims. In the competence, empathy, and polling models, the results show statistically significant evidence that a candidate’s location in the consultant-candidate
network is correlated with their messaging strategy (p < .05). However, there is
no evidence to support our hypothesis with regards to the leadership variable.

5

Consultant victories and network centrality

Given this evidence that campaign strategies are associated with their location in
the consultant-candidate network, we now examine changes in consultants’ ability to influence campaigns over time. Do successful consultants become more
central in the network and thus more influential in shaping campaign strategies
in subsequent election cycles? To assess this hypothesis, we first validate our measures of network centrality in the projected consultant networks and then assess
how relative positions change when consultants win important races.
We use measures of weighted centrality to estimate consultant positions within
the projected networks. In this case, edge weights reflect the number of candidates
7 Information

on polling results was collected only for the 2004 and 2006 cycles.
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Table 2: Network effects on message strategy
Intercept
2004
2006
Democrat
Challenger
Open seat
Female
District GOP
Senate
Issue salience

Risk-taking
-0.4515
(0.3205)
0.2807
(0.1588)
0.5280
(0.1548)
1.3619
(0.1238)
2.6347
(0.1302)
1.5997
(0.1831)
0.1648
(0.1582)
0.0059
(0.0053)
0.0575
(0.1383)
–

District GOP × Democrat

–

2004 × Democrat

–

2006 × Democrat

–

ρ
LR test
(p-value)
N

0.0050
(0.0030)
2.7302
0.0985
692
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Issue ownership
-1.2567
(1.7423)
-5.3779
(0.7575)
-11.5368
(0.7845)
6.0045
(2.3470)
0.6662
(0.5118)
0.6385
(0.6523)
0.3469
(0.5500)
0.0394
(0.0279)
-0.4338
(0.4672)
3.4526
(1.4487)
-0.0866
(0.0426)
8.4128
(1.1264)
19.7092
(1.1846)
0.0059
(0.0026)
5.0533
0.0246
701

Table 3: Network effects on message choices
Intercept
2004
2006
Democrat
Challenger
Open Seat
Female
District GOP
Senate
ρ
LR test
(p-value)
N

Leadership
0.0339
(0.0919)
0.0501
(0.0458)
0.0850
(0.0447)
0.1152
(0.0348)
0.2471
(0.0376)
0.1466
(0.0532)
-0.0437
(0.0463)
0.0019
(0.0015)
0.0175
(0.0401)
-0.0021
(0.0051)
0.1797
0.6716
715

Competence
0.4915
(0.0730)
-0.0104
(0.0364)
0.0154
(0.0355)
0.0156
(0.0273)
0.2849
(0.0297)
0.2209
(0.0417)
-0.0286
(0.0363)
0.0031
(0.0012)
-0.0279
(0.0317)
0.0035
(0.0018)
3.9305
0.0474
715

24

Empathy
0.2600
(0.0991)
-0.1014
(0.0499)
-0.0199
(0.0483)
0.0485
(0.0370)
0.1693
(0.0402)
0.0492
(0.0567)
0.0753
(0.0493)
0.0018
(0.0016)
0.0533
(0.0429)
0.0078
(0.0035)
4.6650
0.0308
715

Polls
0.0445
(0.0767)
-0.0919
(0.0309)
–
0.0281
(0.0304)
0.1360
(0.0322)
0.1243
(0.0502)
-0.0140
(0.0404)
0.0009
(0.0013)
0.0142
(0.0362)
0.0139
(0.0065)
4.6789
0.0305
548

shared by a given consultant (“co-occurrences” in network jargon). Larger values
indicate a consultant-consultant dyad that shares close ties via a set of shared
clients. As such, these relationships will be treated as stronger in computing measures of centrality, a claim we believe has substantive merit in understanding the
network of consultants. In contrast, the alternative approach of treating the edge
weights as binary would have the effect of erasing many candidate relationships
from the network. Empirically, 78% of dyads have an edge weight of 1, 14% have
a weight of 2, 4.2% have a weight of 3, 1.7% have a weight of 4, and 1.3% have a
weight greater than 4 up to a maximum of 11 (the Democratic firms of Cooper &
Secrest and Sutter’s Mill during the 2000 election cycle).
We compute measures of centrality using four metrics appropriate for weighted
data. We employ the generalizations of degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality for weighted networks introduced by Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz
(forthcoming) and implemented in the tnet package for R. We also estimate eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972a,b) on a bipartite adjacency matrix. Since the first
three will not be familiar to many readers, we briefly introduce them in the appendix (the fourth is a standard measure and the procedure by which it is estimated is therefore not discussed further). In each case, the measures differ from
previous centrality measures for weighted networks in the way in which they
combine information about both the number of ties and the strength of those ties.
Measures for unweighted networks only use information about the number of
ties, while previous weighted centrality measures focused on tie strength.

5.1

The most central consulting firms

Table 4 presents the most central Democratic consulting firm by election cycle according to each of the four weighted centrality measures. The list is strikingly
varied. First, while the measures are relatively highly correlated (as most centrality measures are), the firms identified as most central within a given election
cycle frequently vary. In only two election cycles was one firm identified as most
central by all four measures (Murphy Putnam Media in 2004 and Anzalone Liszt
25

Table 4: Most central Democratic consultants
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008

Degree
Cooper & Secrest
Cooper & Secrest
Shrum Devine
Fraioli & Assoc.
Sutter’s Mill
Fraioli & Assoc.
Murphy Putnam
Bennett, Petts
Anzalone Liszt

Eigenvector
Cooper & Secrest
Squier Knapp Dunn
Fenn & King
Sutter’s Mill
Cooper & Secrest
Cooper & Secrest
Murphy Putnam
Lake Research
Anzalone Liszt

Closeness
Greenberg-Lake
Cooper & Secrest
Fenn & King
Fraioli & Assoc.
Cooper & Secrest
Fraioli & Assoc.
Murphy Putnam
Blaemire Comm.
Anzalone Liszt

Betweenness
Squier Knapp Dunn
Cooper & Secrest
Cooper & Secrest
Fraioli & Assoc.
Garin Hart Yang
Fraioli & Assoc.
Murphy Putnam
Anzalone Liszt
Anzalone Liszt

Table 5: Most central Republican consultants

1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008

Degree
Tarrance Group
Tarrance Group
Public Opinion Strat.
Tarrance Group
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.

Eigenvector
Tarrance Group
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Keelen Comm.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Moore Information
Public Opinion Strat.

Closeness
Tarrance Group
Tarrance Group
Public Opinion Strat.
Keelen Comm.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.

Betweenness
Tarrance Group
Tarrance Group
Public Opinion Strat.
Tarrance Group
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.
Public Opinion Strat.

Research in 2008) and four different firms were identified by one measure as most
central in 2006. In addition, the list shows relatively significant turnover—none of
the firms identified as most central in 1992 and 1994 were among the most central
in 2004, 2006, or 2008.
The list of the most central Republican consultants presented in Table 5 suggests very different conclusions. Only four firms appear in the table, which is
dominated by the Tarrance Group (which appears to be the most central firm in
the 1992 and 1994 election cycles) and Public Opinion Strategies (which reached a
position of centrality in 1994 and largely took over the list starting in 2000).
These findings provide an empirical basis for qualitative claims that the Demo26

cratic consultant network is more decentralized than the Republican one. A more
formal comparison is provided by Figure 8, which compares the unweighted degree centralization of the two party networks. The figure suggests that the Republican was consistently more centralized until the last two election cycles when
Democrats caught up. In both 2006 and 2008, degree centralization was virtually
identical across parties.

5.2

Electoral success and subsequent network centrality

Since the centrality measures seem to capture meaningful substantive information about the practice of political consulting within the two major parties, we
therefore seek to determine whether firms’ relative positions change depending
on their electoral track record. Assessing the effect of consultants on campaign
outcomes is a difficult inferential problem for social scientists, but within politics
it is an article of faith that “better” consultants improve the chances of victory for
their clients. As such, we expect firms will be rewarded for success and penalized
for failure. In this way, the decentralized party network can adapt (however imperfectly) to the electoral environment, broadening the usage of tactics and strategies that seem to be working and discarding those that seem less effective.
The dependent variable in our analysis is each consulting firm’s percentile
rank to each of the four weighted centrality measures described above. For instance, the weighted degree centrality dependent variable for firm i represents
the percentage of all firms within i’s party that are less central than i in a given
election cycle. Firms with undefined values for closeness and betweenness are
assumed to be tied as the least central. In practice, the dependent variables are
centered near 50 and typically range from 0 to 98 with the exception of betweenness centrality (which has a higher minimum value of 16 for Democrats and 24 for
Republicans due to ties). To control for persistence in firm reputation and clients
over time, we include a lagged dependent variable as a predictor.
We operationalize significant electoral successes in two ways. First, Campaigns
& Elections published a list of “big winners” in House and Senate races after each
27
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election cycle from 1996 to 2002. Given its status as the trade magazine of the
campaign business, C&E (now Politics) is an important arbiter within the industry.
Its list also reflects elite perceptions on which victories were most significant. As
such, we include a count of the number of “big winner” victories for each firm by
election cycle as a predictor of network centrality in the subsequent cycle.
Second, we include the number of non-incumbent victories for a firm in each
cycle. We restrict this analysis to the period covered by the “big winners” list
(1996–2002). Since open-seat and challenger campaigns are typically the most
competitive and demanding settings in which to succeed, a string of victories in
such races can electrify the political elite. For instance, the Washington Post described John Anzalone as “[t]he best pollster you’ve never heard of,” stating that
“The Democratic survey research firm became among the hottest in the nation after the 2006 cycle in which it conducted polling for Reps. Heath Shuler (N.C.), Ron
Klein (Fla.), Paul W. Hodes (N.H.) and Jason Altmire (Pa.)—all of whom defeated
Republican incumbents” (2008). Anzalone’s firm, Anzalone Liszt Research, was
subsequently the most central Democratic consulting firm on all four weighted
centrality measures in the 2008 cycle.
Given the likelihood that the residuals for the models of the four centrality
rank measures are highly correlated, we estimate seemingly unrelated regressions
(Zellner 1962; Zellner and Huang 1962; Zellner 1963) with small-sample statistics
and a small-sample correction for all firms in our sample that appear in the data
in two consecutive election cycles. Table 6 presents the results for Democratic
consultants. Model diagnostics indicate that the residuals were very highly correlated across the four equations, validating the SUR approach (Breusch-Pagan test
of independence: χ2 (6) = 673.64, p < .01).
Despite variation over time in the most central firms, we observe the expected
persistence in centrality over time, which is reflected in the highly significant
lagged dependent variable. More interestingly, the number of non-incumbent
victories by Democratic firms is strongly associated with subsequent network centrality across each of the four dependent variables (p < .01) even after accounting
for expected levels of persistence in centrality between cycles. By contrast, the
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Table 6: Democratic consultants: Track record and centrality
Degree Eigenvector
Lagged DV
0.34***
0.36***
(0.04)
(0.04)
Non-incumbent victories 4.51***
5.04***
(0.99)
(1.01)
“Big winners” (C&E)
1.02
-0.07
(1.24)
(1.26)
Constant
28.66***
26.53***
(2.40)
(2.32)
2
R
0.44
0.46
N
209
209

Closeness
0.39***
(0.05)
3.40***
(0.92)
1.06
(1.15)
27.55***
(2.65)
0.44
209

Betweenness
0.31***
(0.04)
4.70***
(1.14)
-0.09
(1.43)
29.11***
(2.65)
0.34
209

* p < .10; p < .05; *** p < .01
number of “big winners” is not significant for any of the dependent variables.
Table 7 shows comparable results for the Republican network (residuals were
again very highly correlated across equations—Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ2 (6) = 490.39, p < .01). As in the Democratic results, the lagged dependent variable is highly significant, indicating that firms’ relative status is persistent over time. The GOP results also indicate that the number of non-incumbent
victories by a consulting firm is closely related to its subsequent electoral centrality (p < .01 for all four dependent variables). However, unlike the Democratic
results, the number of “big winner” victories is also consistently associated with
future centrality (p < .05 in all four cases). The substantive implications of this
apparent difference in party behavior are unclear. However, these results confirm
that consulting firms’ relative positioning changes meaningfully in response to
electoral track records, providing a mechanism by which apparent success may
generate increased influence within the party in future elections.
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Table 7: Republican consultants: Track record and centrality
Degree Eigenvector
Lagged DV
0.24***
0.20***
(0.05)
(0.05)
Non-incumbent victories 2.60***
2.92***
(0.92)
(0.96)
“Big winners” (C&E)
0.58**
0.58**
(0.25)
(0.27)
Constant
36.42***
37.23***
(3.25)
(3.29)
2
R
0.27
0.23
N
148
148

Closeness
0.19***
(0.07)
2.68***
(0.81)
0.55**
(0.22)
42.58***
(3.68)
0.27
148

Betweenness
0.22***
(0.05)
2.79***
(0.96)
0.58**
(0.27)
36.01***
(3.35)
0.23
148

* p < .10; p < .05; *** p < .01

6

Discussion and conclusion

Thurber (1998) once described scholarship on campaign consultants as “a subfield
in search of a theory.” In this paper, we have sought to address that gap, developing a new theoretical perspective on the role of consultants in contemporary parties, the process by which they disseminate campaign strategies within the party,
and the way in which they are rewarded (or punished) based on the success of
those tactics. We analyze these claims with the most comprehensive dataset on
consultant-candidate relationships that has been assembled to date, showing not
not just that “consultants matter” in a broad sense, but providing evidence of how
a candidate’s specific location in the consultant-candidate network influences the
content of the campaign. These findings provide support for the notion that a
broader perspective is needed on contemporary parties that takes into account
the many supporting actors who operate outside formal party institutions.
In future research, we hope to broaden this agenda to include data on consultants’ role in primary elections—an important part of contemporary parties—as
well as presidential elections. We also hope to consider other measures of cam-

31

paign behavior and strategy such as television advertising data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project (Goldstein, Franz and Ridout 2002; Goldstein and Rivlin
2005, 2007) or issue position data from the National Political Awareness Test (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001).
We wish to conclude with two important caveats. First, it is important to note
that the optimistic perspective on the role of consultants advanced in this article
depends on their ability to contribute meaningfully to the electoral success of the
candidates they advise. If instead consultants are largely hired as a result of irrelevant factors such as personal charisma, the system will not operate effectively.
Second, the party system we describe is an institutional arrangement that serves
the purpose of helping candidates who share a common label to win office. Ideological goals are largely irrelevant to that system except insofar as they advance
the probability of victory for affiliated candidates. While consultants may help advance a common party message, they are unlikely to put the ideological agenda of
party activists ahead of the electoral interests of their clients. Indeed, the market
pressure to win implies that consultants may neglect the ideological goals of their
clients in pursuit of electoral advantage. For better or worse, the currency of the
adaptive party network we have described is winning.

32

Appendix: New measures of weighted centrality
Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz (N.d.) define degree centrality as k ×
(1− α )

 α
si
ki

=

ki
× siα where k i is the standard measure of degree centrality for node i in
an unweighted network, si is the sum of all edge weights for node i, and α is a
tuning parameter set by the researcher. Setting α = 0 returns the standard degree centrality measure, while setting α = 1 returns what is called the measure of
node strength (Barrat et al. 2004). Values of α between 0 and 1 represent a combination of information about the number of ties to i and the strength of those
ties. In the case of our projected consultant networks, we expect consultants who
have shared clients with a large number of other firms to be especially important
and influential, but we also wish to incorporate information about the strength of
those relationships, which are likely to vary depending on the number of clients in
common between two firms. We therefore set α to 0.5 to incorporate information
from both measures.
Similarly, standard measures of closeness and betweenness rely on computations of the minimum distance between nodes i and j in unweighted networks
where each connected dyad is treated as being one unit apart. Newman (2001)
and Brandes (2001) generalize this to weighted networks by treating the distance
between nodes i and j as w1 where w is the weight of the edge. Opsahl, Agneessens
and Skvoretz propose a generalization in which the distance is instead w1α with
α again representing a tuning parameter and α = 0 returns the standard unweighted measure. This distance measure is incorporated straightforwardly in
the standard definitions of closeness and betweenness (Freeman 1979) (see Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz for details). We again set α=0.5 to allow both tie
strength and the number of ties to influence computations of the minimum distance between nodes. Substantively, consultants that are high on closeness are
(on average) not far from most other firms in network terms, while those who are
high on betweenness fall on a relatively high number of shortest paths between
other firms—both could reasonably be expected to reflect positions of influence
and stature within the industry.
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